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LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS.' By William K 
Muir, Jr. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
1982. Pp. xiv, 219. $19. 
One might expect a book about a state legislature to be a muck-
raking expose of one of America's worst political institutions. The 
study of state legislatures has, after all, traditionally been a course on 
political bosses, backroom dealings, and the financial influence of 
lobbyists. 1 Professor William Muir's2 portrayal of the California 
legislature from 1975 through 19783 provides a welcome relief from 
this negative stereotype. Professor Muir analogizes the legislature to 
a "school" where most members acquire what James Madison called 
the three competencies of democratic leadership: patriotism, love of 
justice, and wisdom (pp. 3-4).4 From 1975 to 1978, Muir contends, 
I. See, e.g., w. MORRIS, NORTH TOWARD HOME 204-09 (1967). 
2. William K. Muir, Jr. is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley. He is the author of PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND 
ATTITUDE CHANGE (1967) and POLICE: STREET-CORNER POLITICIANS (1977). 
3. Professor Muir served on two staff committees, business and welfare, during the 1975-76 
Session of the California legislature. In 1977-78, he conducted interviews with twenty-eight 
legislators. The theme of the questions was, "As a legislator, how do you make the legislature 
intelligible to laymen?" 
4. By patriotism, Madison meant an expanded sympathy for all of one's constituents; by 
love of justice, he implied a concern for fair play and adherence to procedures; and by wisdom, 
he referred to the kind of enlightened statecraft necessary to achieve enduring improvements 
in the general welfare. Pp. 3-4; see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 51, 53 & 63 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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the California legislature was unusually successful in providing its 
"students" with an education. 
Professor Muir identifies three ingredients that contributed to the 
quality of education during the 1975-76 "golden age" (p. 9) of the 
California legislature. The first ingredient was the dispersion of 
power. Two factors were mainly responsible for this decentraliza-
tion. The first was the "author'' system of shepherding bills through 
the legislative process. The author system allowed each legislator to 
maintain control of every bill he or she sponsored (p. 58). This sys-
tem contrasts with that of the United States Congress, in which a 
committee takes control of a bill and marks it up. Control by com-
mittee fosters centralized decisionmaking, because when committees 
make changes without the author's concurrence, lobbyists tend to 
deal only with committee chairs (p. 58).5 The second decentralizing 
factor was the requirement of a roll call for every vote in committee. 
This requirement prevented committee chairs from arrogating exces-
sive power to themselves by ignoring the actual votes of committee 
members and making unilateral decisions. 
This dispersal power created a need for the dissemination of in-
formation to all members of the legislature. California's effective 
"system of support," the mechanism by which information was dis-
tributed abundantly and on a nonpartisan basis, was the second in-
gredient contributing to the high quality of education.6 Information 
flowed to legislators from nonpartisan staff and from lobbyists. The 
nonpartisan support staff operated from within three independent 
organizations: the Committees themselves; the Office of Legislative 
Analysis; and a research office that provided a "Third Reading 
Analysis." Committee staffs conducted the basic research pertaining 
to the bills in their respective committees. The Office of Legislative 
Analysis acted as the legislature's agent in overseeing the executive 
branch. This Office was also responsible for analyzing the Gover-
nor's proposed annual budget. The research office provided a 
"Third Reading Analysis," which gave each legislator a short 
description and discussion of every bill that reached the floor of the 
legislature. The legislators thus had access to a report on a bill pre-
pared independently of the staff of the committee that had sent the 
bill to the floor. Lobbyists also were a valuable source of informa-
tion. With their financial clout apparently curtailed by strict disclo-
5. The Author system - under which every bill would be entitled to a hearing - would 
not be feasible in the United States House of Representatives, which has 435 members. In 
contrast, the California State Assembly has only 80 members, and the State Senate has 40 
Senators. 
6. Although an efficient flow of high quality information may be necessary for the effective 
functioning of any legislature, one must view Muir's praise for the California system with a 
degree of caution. Muir himself was one of those engaged in the collection and dissemination 
of information. His observations while so employed form the basis for his book. 
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sure requirements of campaign and personal contributions to 
legislators, lobbyists could wield influence only by providing accu-
rate information. 
The third and final ingredient that contributed to the success of 
the California legislature was that it required its members to acquire 
specialized knowledge. Muir argues that the structure of Califor-
nia's system, rather than the desire for reelection, provided the in-
centive for legislators to obtain specialized knowledge. Although the 
time that the legislators spent acquiring knowledge in the state capi-
tal reduced the time available for essential reelection activities in 
their home districts, two features of California's system provided 
counter-incentives that favored the acquisition of knowledge. The 
'first was the author system, which placed primary responsibility for a 
bill in the hands of its author. Only an author expert in the subject 
matter of his bill could defend it successfully. The second feature 
was the "Buddy System Rule." This "rule" required members to 
vote against a bill only on its merits and not for other reasons such as 
vote swapping or inertia. Thus, the burden of explaining a vote fell 
on the naysayers. To justify a negative vote, a legislator had to state 
his understanding of the bill and his reasons for voting no. Such a 
justification obviously required an understanding of the bill. 
These incentives produced two benefits. First, they made the leg-
islature a place where high-quality information was assimilated and 
disseminated. This information provided the foundation for innova-
tive and successful policymaking. Second, the development of spe-
cialization facilitated effective oversight of the state bureaucracy. 
Having set forth the three ingredients that made the California 
State Legislature particularly productive, Muir turns his attention to 
"the universal rules, the general principles about mankind and soci-
ety, that governed the legislative systems so as to produce a superior 
education in political competency'' (p. 101). Muir does not view 
competition between the two major parties as the primary process 
that made the legislature tick. The power of political parties and of 
patronage was relatively insignificant in the California legislature. 
Primary elections, instead of party leaders, determined a party's 
nominee for every elective office. Few jobs were filled by virtue of 
partronage, since civil service was the only route to all but the high-
est level political appointments (p. 117). Legislators from both par-
ties obtained information from nonpartisan support staffs (p. 113). 7 
7. Although the presence of a nonpartisan support staff assures all legislators of access to 
information, the political parties are not irrelevant sources of knowledge. Since legislators in 
the same party often act as if they were teammates, each party develops its own specialists 
within the parameters of its philosophical viewpoints. P. 134. Thus, the presence of a Demo-
cratic specialist in one area does not prevent a young Republican member from developing a 
similar expertise. Additionally, the threat of resourceful partisan competition keeps the non• 
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In addition, the speaker could select as committee chairs legislators 
who were not members of the majority party (p. 150). 
Muir argues that the legislature operates by the principle of reci-
procity rather than inter-party competition. By "reciprocity," Muir 
means mutually-beneficial exchanges between two persons, which 
leave both persons better off as a result. Thus, reciprocity is a means 
by which Person A can influence Person B to do something of value 
for A that B would not otherwise do (p. 107). Reciprocity, unlike 
coercion and manipulation, can operate on a voluntary basis because 
both sides benefit from the exchange (p. 107). 
Of course, for a system of reciprocity to work, individuals must 
have something of value to exchange with others. In the case of the 
California legislature, Muir suggests, that "something" was knowl-
edge, the information that members had obtained as a result of spe-
cializing. Muir's description of the exchange of knowledge among 
legislators reminds the reader of the economist's classical market: 
here, one member bartered his knowledge about one problem in ex-
change for another member's knowledge about something else. 
Knowledge was both the currency of the legislature and the com-
modity that it traded. 8 Members specialized so that they could ac-
quire something that others both lacked and valued. "Monopolies" 
of knowledge in certain areas did not last, because the barriers to the 
acquisition of knowledge were low and alternative sources of inf or-
mation were readily available (p. 129). In short, the legislative sys-
tem Muir describes had all of the trappings of an efficiently 
operating barter economy. 
After showcasing the effectiveness of the California legislature 
and explaining the principles on which it ran, Muir evaluates a 
number of "reforms" advanced by various groups to improve the 
functioning of state legislatures (pp. 192-98). His reactions to these 
proposals and to some of his own proposals are the most provocative 
part of the book. Muir rejects increasing party discipline, limiting 
legislators' contacts with lobbyists, making legislative electoral dis-
tricts more competitive, and more frequent elections as misguided. 
In the end, Muir stands firm in his support for a system similar to the 
one in which he participated during his stay in California. 
Although Muir offers some provocative ideas on which reforms 
would work and which would not, the reader is left with some nag-
partisan support system energetic, balanced in its analyses, and as fair as humanly possible. P. 
135. 
8. Although knowledge is necessary for legislative reciprocity, the legislators' will to learn 
goes beyond the desire of each individual to influence another. Each California legislator is, 
by ambition and circumstance, a full-time politician. Job security is not among the many 
benefits of political life. Thus, the legislator must internalize the benefits of the legislative 
experience in order to carry his acquired knowledge on to the next stage of his public career. 
P. 116. 
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ging doubts. First, one suspects that Muir's enthusiasm at having 
been a staff member for two committees during the "golden years" 
of the California legislature may have biased his vision. Muir admits 
that by 1980, the state legislature seemed "shaky and fragile" (p. 11). 
Additionally, he notes that legislatures seem to run in cycles, from 
high points of effective operation to low points, from abuses to re-
form. These admissions lead one to wonder whether the system is 
the solution or whether forces external to the system propel the cy-
cles. Second, Muir glosses over the question of the extent to which 
legislators are beholden to the groups with the most money. He 
seems to assume that disclosure requirements sufficiently limit the 
financial influence of lobbyists. Many would no doubt challenge this 
assumption. . 
Despite these :flaws, Professor Muir has offered a ray of hope for 
effective state government. Legislature is an excellent book for the 
student of government and for those interested in legislative reform. 
Muir's study also has a broader appeal. Legislature is a public mon-
ument to the notion that good government is possible, even in the 
state legislature. The education of the public is critical if we are to 
be governed by the educated. The key to the success of the "golden 
age" of the California legislature was that it educated its members, 
tomorrow's leaders. A study of the conditions under which an insti-
tution fosters knowledge of effective government is a study of the 
circumstances under which democracy will remain a viable political 
system. Herein lies the value of Legislature. 
